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Why the Proportional Representation 
System Fails to Promote Minority Interests?




Proportional representation (PR) is favoured as the most suitable 
form of electoral system for multi-ethnic societies because it allows 
every vote to be counted. It, therefore, provides a strong incentive for 
minority parties and other political groups to promote their political 
articulations. This article examines the PR system in contemporary 
Sri Lankan politics. It argues that the executive presidential system 
has negated the efficacy of the PR system in promoting minority 
parties and has had disastrous consequences on their political 
fortunes. The PR system has enabled Muslim communities to elect 
Muslim representatives from their own province. Specifically, this 
article emphasizes the dynamics of the political fortunes of the Sri 
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which seeks to give a voice to the 
minority Muslim communities concentrated in the Eastern Province.
Introduction
In a first-past-the-post (FPP) ballot, the first candidate to 
gain the highest amount of votes are elected. This electoral system 
has been deemed controversial in countries with pluralist societies 
in terms of ethnicity, religion, or language. Through the FPP 
system, in which a specific constituency elects its representative, 
the will of the majority can prevail in electing their representative 
on the basis of the above factors. In contrast, the proportional 
representation (PR) systems have a low cut-off point – for example, 
five per cent in Sri Lanka. That can allow for a small minority to 
gain representation due to the larger number of representatives 
allocated to a particular district. The system also encourages those 
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who seek office to nurse and cultivate minorities, as every vote is 
counted in the ultimate result. However, contemporary politics in 
Sri Lanka has demonstrated that the PR system does not serve this 
lofty ideal of providing a voice to the voiceless minorities, such as 
the Muslim community, Catholics, or the Hindus, wherever such 
groupings find themselves as a minority.
FPP and PR systems are popular in most national electoral 
systems worldwide. They represent two general – and often 
narrowly defined – choices that countries opt for. There are also 
many differentially applied versions at work in different countries, 
satisfying different electoral systems. Since the end of World War II, 
they have generally been used for national legislative/parliamentary 
elections in democractic states such as the US and Britain and 
its former colonies, including Australia and Canada. These are the 
countries that adopted FPP of the Westminster model.  
Sri Lanka’s electoral system changed to PR when the Second 
Republican Constitution of 1978 introduced a kind of PR system 
which replaced the FPP system, or simple plurality system, that had 
been in practice since independence in 1948. This change was spelt 
out in Article 99 in 13 paragraphs. It contained some distinctive 
features. For the first time, voters could vote for the parties and 
individuals from a list of several names put forward by the parties. 
Also, there was provision for obtaining bonus seats when a party 
scored the highest in a district. A third interesting provision was 
the high cut-off point of 12.5 per cent of the total votes polled in the 
district. This was the minimum number a party/group had to obtain 
to acquire an allocation of seats. It was designed with the intention 
to weaken small parties and ensure the longevity of the major 
parties. However, with the 14th amendment to the Constitution 
lowering the cut-off point to five per cent in 1988, smaller parties 
such as the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) Jathika Hela 
Urumaya (JHU), and Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), emerged 
and enjoyed a greater prominence in the parliamentary process 
in elections held in 1989, 1994, and 2000. While SLMC was the 
main beneficiary of this system, parties such as JHU and ITAK also 
gained access to political power through the reduction of the cut-
off point. Although the objective of the 14th amendment intended to 
encourage smaller parties/groups to contest elections, one could 
not claim that the same levels of success persisted, especially for a 
minority party such as SLMC, after the General Elections held in 
the subsequent years 2001, 2004 and 2010.  
The single transferable vote (STV), a distinctive feature of the 
PR system, was first put into practice in the general election of 
1989. In this system, the voter first elects his/her political party 
based on a list of candidates published by the party during the 
nomination period. Then, the voter casts the preferential vote for 
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three candidates from the chosen party’s list. This STV provides 
voter choice. The PR system replaced features of the FPP system 
that promoted some significant outcomes such as the two-party 
system and land-slide parliamentary majorities in excess of electoral 
support in terms of votes obtained. “Proportional representation was 
advanced by the framers and defenders of the 1978 Constitution as 
a major mechanism of minority representation and accommodation, 
in what is otherwise as extraordinarily centralizing constitutional 
instrument” (Edrisinha and Welikala, 2009). Although, specific 
aspects of the PR system under the 1978 Constitution have been 
critiqued, the basic principle of PR does not seem to have been 
fundamentally refuted – and to a point in which a return to the 
FPP would be required. “It has also to be said that PR is the only 
form of minority accommodation that Sri Lanka has managed to 
successfully institutionalise so far” (ibid). The early years showed 
that the PR system promoted the interests of the minority parties 
– ethno-religious or otherwise – and they flourished where their 
support became indispensable for the survival and stability of the 
major parties and governments.  
However, recent political developments indicate that while the 
minorities have consistently expressed their will in a demonstratable 
fashion, representatives elected under the system have indulged 
in political horse trading for ministerial offices and other forms of 
government patronage. This statement cannot be disputed because 
the trend of going against their obtained mandate has always 
been one-sided. Most often, representatives end up shifting from 
opposition to the government after elections. The PR system does 
not have the provision of seeking endorsement of the electors for 
political decisions taken by their elected representatives until the 
next parliamentary elections, especially at times when a minority 
party’s constituency gives a mandate to its representatives to stay 
in opposition. The representatives who shift allegiance once voted to 
office often claim that they have consulted their constituency. This 
in a way threatens to weaken and destroy such a minority party’s 
constituency under the very system that promoted it. One wonders 
what has caused this strange twist of fate for PR to function in a 
manner which stifles the will of the minority/small parties, belying 
its original features that promised to strengthen the interests of the 
minorities.
The paper intends to point out some positive interpretations 
of PR and its efficacy in the most immediate context of Sri Lanka. 
There are many factors challenging the PR system from bringing 
out its best features in giving voice to minority/smaller parties, as 
the system initially did. These include a seemingly weak parliament 
in comparison to the executive presidential system, a judiciary 
reluctant to resort to judicial activism (for example, in comparison 
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to the Indian Supreme Court which ordered the immediate 
distribution of grain that had not been properly stored and eaten 
by rodents), and the changing context of the political climate of 
the day. The paper attempts to show why the PR system does not 
work as it was expected to, highlighting certain circumstances in 
reference to a minority party such as the SLMC. 
Historical and theoretical context of PR system in Sri Lanka
Providing a brief background and historical context in 
which the PR system was introduced is helpful at this point. The 
constitution of the First Republic (1972) aimed at strengthening 
the executive power and maintaining the Westminister model 
formulated for Sri Lanka by Britain from 1946-1948. The Second 
Republic of 1978, however, introduced the presidential trend which 
ushered in new political styles and provisions such as a popularly 
elected executive president, proportional representation, a reduced 
role for parliament, referendal democracy, a charter of fundamental 
rights, and consultative advisory committees to ministers. The 
prime ministerial and cabinet government was maintained to help 
decision making.
A. J. Wilson (1980: 1), in his seminal work the Gaullist 
System in Asia, wrote with reference to the Sri Lankan presidential 
system that: “There were two propositions, really interconnected, 
which engaged Jayawardene’s attention. Firstly, there was a 
search for executive stability. Secondly, there was an anxiety to 
create and maintain consensus politics, both were intended as 
devices to pull the country out of its economic morass”. Based on 
a report of the Select Committee that outlined the unsatisfactory 
clauses of the First Republic, the Second Republic set out to rectify 
them. Particular features of contention that the Select Committee 
highlighted included the excessive amount of time a prime 
minister had to spend as the executive in the legislature, leading 
to a “sluggish way in which the government and developmental 
administration was conducted”. Another concern was over the 
instability in the government. This was caused by defections within 
the ruling parliamentary group pressures from powerful lobbies, 
awareness in the movement towards authoritarianism caused 
by the manner in which the victors obtained sweeping majorities 
at General Elections, and a desire to return to liberal concepts 
of government. This desire was to be achieved by the insertion 
of suitable provisions in the areas of fundamental language and 
citizenship rights. Above all, there was anxiety to ensure the 
independence of the judiciary. Government spokesmen appeared 
to be seriously concerned with the inroads that had been made into 
the independence of the judiciary during the seven-year phase of 
the United Front government (Wilson, 1980: 34). 
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In the 1978 Constitution, the parliamentary system which 
evolved from the pre-independence period remained in a different 
form. Unlike in other elections, candidates competing in presidential 
elections had to compete on an island-wide basis. The executive 
functions as the head of the cabinet, and is required to appoint a 
prime minister who is believed to command the confidence of the 
legislature. It is pertinent here to note that the members of the 
cabinet and outside the cabinet are appointed by the president and 
have the authority to assign responsibilities and functions to such 
ministers. J. R. Jayawardene, who was prime minister, assumed 
office as president on February 4, 1978, replacing most salient 
features of the First Republic. In his speech at the second reading 
stage, he spoke of the influencing sources of his Constitution. The 
amendment, he said, “would make our Constitution a combination 
of the presidential system and the parliamentary system as we 
know it in the United Kingdom”. He alluded to the source of his 
heart’s desire – the structure that General de Gaulle had fashioned 
for France. The French created, he said, a “new republican 
constitution, a combination of the American and British systems 
where the president is elected by the whole national and he chooses 
his cabinet from among the members of parliament” (Wilson, 1980: 
29). 
Thomas Hare, born in 1806, is the founding father of the 
STV system and PR. He believed that it would serve as a more 
representative parliament. He advocated that, in order to achive 
this, it required a substantial change to a voting system that would 
help identify and reward candidates on a merit basis rather than 
merely getting elected on the party ticket. This devise was mainly 
intended to allow representation to significant minority interests, 
address these groups’ grievances of representation and encourage 
voter turnout. Hare’s concept allowed for votes to be transferable 
by getting voters to rank candidates in order of preference on the 
ballot paper. Votes could, therefore, move from candidates who 
had already polled sufficient votes or from those who were not so 
successful.  
The transfer process is aimed at reducing the problem of having 
two kinds of wasted votes. First, the process prevents wasting the 
votes of candidates who stand little chance of winning. Secondly, 
they prevent the waste of excess votes a winning candidate needs. 
Transferring these votes to a voter’s next ranked choice helps the 
election of another candidate, rather than have votes that are cast 
but are not helpful in electing anyone. The FPP system is known 
for its large number of wasted votes compared to the PR, leading 
to party misrepresentation and under-representation of political 
minorities, racial minorities, and women, etc. 
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Although Hare’s proposal attracted many political scientists 
of the day, it was critiqued for not being practical. He envisaged a 
situation in which voters were to receive a list of candidates covering 
the entire country (with several thousand names perhaps). With no 
restriction to geographic areas, he thought voters would be able to 
list, in order of their preference, members from organsiations and 
interest groups. In Hare’s scheme, “the quota would be calculated 
by dividing the total votes across the country by the number of seats 
to be filled”, a ratio known as the ‘Hare quota’. “Surplus votes of 
candidates reaching the quota in constituencies, as well as papers 
for unsuccessful candidates, were to be transferred to a national 
registrar for subsequent allocation according to voters’ preferences. 
Even today, with all the benefits of information technology running 
an election in this way would be a horrendous task, but in the 
middle of the 19th century it was a non-starter” (ERS, Newsletter). 
Hare had, however, introduced the key features of the STV. He laid 
the foundations from which others, including Catherine Spence 
(1861) and Henry Droop (1868), developed the system we know 
today. 
PR’s promotion of coalitions of commitment
Donald Horowitz (1985) believed that the legislative system 
adopted for the Second Sri Lankan Republic would be expected to 
have a moderating effect on ethnic politics. 
The principal purpose of the proportional representation 
scheme that was adopted was to prevent small swings in votes from 
producing a large swing in number of seats. Sri Lanka has had 
a change of government in virtually every parliamentary election, 
and shares of seats have frequently been far out of line with shares 
of the total vote… but PR does this less prominently than first-
past-the-post; and PR does not generally magnify changes in party 
support when legislative seats are allocated, so it is particularly 
responsive to the oscillation problem the framers of the Sri Lanka 
constitution were addressing (Horowitz, 1985: 641).
What does PR mean in ethnic terms in Sri Lanka? 
…PR should be conducive to Sinhalese moderation.PR in 
multi-member constituencies tends to reduce the seat advantage 
enjoyed by territorially concentrated minorities such as the Tamils… 
The conciliatory effects derive, rather, from the apportionment 
of Sinhalese seats… First of all, PR seems likely to achieve the 
intended effect of reducing the spread between share of votes and 
seats. With Sinhalese seats more evenly divided between the two 
main parties, Tamil support should more often be pivotal to the 
formation and maintenance of parliamentary majorities than it has 
previously been (Horowitz, 1985: 642). 
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This also could be applied to the Muslim candidates and the 
Muslim parties. Like in the case of the Tamil and Muslim parties, 
although the minority may not gain seats under PR, there may well 
be an increase in the number of Tamil and Muslim candidates. 
In multi-member constituencies with Muslim minorities, Muslim 
candidates might even appear on Tamil and Sinhala party lists. 
“The constituency list system of PR makes it more attractive for 
parties to have Tamil candidates than it was under first-past-the 
post” (ibid). “PR also tends to encourage moderation in electoral 
appeals where minority voters in a constituency can be alienated 
by Sinhalese extremism. Under the first-past-the-post [system], 
at least in some constituencies, minority voters could be ignored 
by Sinhalese parties without paying a penalty in seats. Now that 
every last vote counts, this is a less compelling strategy” (ibid:642). 
Horowitz also theorised the features of ‘coalitions of commitment’ 
and ‘coalitions of convenience’ forged in multi-party systems and 
based on the fundamentals of PR (ibid:377-388).
Horowitz, in referring to ties across ethnic lines as ‘multi-
ethnicity’ even if there were only two groups involved, believed that 
this would require “mutual restraint and reciprocal concessions”. 
He believed that it could lead to compromise policies and feelings of 
exclusions that might further lead to power-sharing arrangements. 
According to him, such multi-ethnic arrangements came in 
different packages. The kinds of packages on offer may vary with 
key features on how and why they are meant to blend, or why they 
intend to remain permanent but organisationally separate. 
According to Horowitz (1985): “Group relations in multi-ethnic 
party settings can be placed readily along a spectrum, according 
to the nature and duration of the party’s commitments and the 
organisational form appropriate to each arrangement”. According 
to him there are two categories of alliances. There is first the 
‘coalition of convenience’, stimulated by little or nothing beyond the 
requisite for ethnic parties to form a government. The second kind 
is the coalitions of mixed convenience and commitment, referred 
to as ‘coalitions of commitment’. These are, again, nourished and 
sustained by the need to form a government, but also by some hope 
of having a beneficial impact on ethnic conflict with a “blend of 
conviction and convenience” (ibid: 369-388).
In his early observation of Sri Lanka in the 1980s, Horowitz 
(1985) believed that the PR system would remedy many of the ills in 
minority grievances related to non-representation. He also believed 
that the system would give parties a variety of choices, especially 
in using their independent discretion in alliance making of their 
choice. The PR system was supposed to ultimately cement coalitions 
of commitment between the Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim parties. 
However, he added a word of caution in that not all these positive 
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features could be taken for granted in the context of terrorism and, 
also, with Tamils not being able to play a normal parliamentary 
role.  
The PR system worked ideally for a minority party like 
the SLMC in the recent past, such as when the party was 
conceptualised and nurtured, and showed excellent polling results 
in the 1980s-1990s. That was the time when SLMC flourished 
under President Premadasa of the UNP from 1989-1994. SLMC 
sided with the ruling party after showing its strength in the region 
and the provincial council elections in 1988. SLMC won 17 seats in 
the then-merged North-East – where it became the chief opposition 
party – and also proved its worth with 12 seats across the Western, 
North-Western, Central and Southern provinces. The heyday of 
SLMC was possible because of the PR system. The newly born 
minority party was able to flourish and achieve impressive results. 
This worked as an incentive for incumbent President Premadasa 
to be benevolent toward SLMC in order to help himself – mainly in 
view of the ensuing presidential elections. 
The subsequent parliamentary elections of 1989 also 
proved to be successful for SLMC when it won four seats polling 
independently. The party’s founding leader, M. H. M. Ashraff won 
for himself a massive number of preferential votes. The same 
favourable climes continued for SLMC when it decided to switch 
sides to support the front-running presidential candidate from 
the opposition People’s Alliance (PA), Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, who became executive president in 1994. The SLMC 
had earlier showed her evidence of its power. She was also impressed 
of the party’s performance in the elections and was more than 
happy to accommodate SLMC. In the subsequent parliamentary 
election in 1994, SLMC won six elected seats and two National List 
seats contesting under its own symbol in the North-East. Under the 
new leadership of Rauf Hakeem after the untimely demise of the 
founder leader Ashraff, SLMC in the general elections of October 
2000, had 11 seats in parliament. It also earnestly remained a 
strong constituent party of the ruling coalition government that 
lasted until 2001, when SLMC shifted its support to the opposition 
coalition of United National Front (UNF). 
When SLMC earned the wrath of the executive president and 
judiciary, headed by a chief justice whose determinations in cases 
of citizens versus state were matters still under public debate, the 
party was open to powerful attacks by forces that stifled its course. 
The anti-Muslim riots in Mawanella – in the Kandy District – and 
the lead role Hakeem played in demanding disciplinary actions 
against a minister who was allegedly involved in the riots, was a 
principle cause in souring the good relationship between SLMC and 
the executive president. The president took no action to appease 
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the reservations of the SLMC and Muslims in general. The party 
also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the 
main opposition party, the UNP, (the main opposition party) and 
subsequently joined the opposition benches. This finally developed 
into a continuing process in which the SLMC switched its allegiance 
to successive governments and, therefore, gained a reputation for 
political expediency or political duplicity. In terms of grass-roots 
political allegiance, the party was weakened.
The variety of interpretations and the different styles of 
governance by individuals holding office as the executive president, 
largely determine the use of PR as a tool for truly pluralistic 
governance. When the outcome from the PR factories produced 
favourable results, the best features of the PR system’s support for 
the smaller groups were evident. There were also times when the 
office of the executive president made inroads toward crippling the 
spheres in which PR functioned especially in the case of the smaller 
parties’ disregarding of PR’s importance as a tool for minority group 
representation.
Executive presidency and the judiciary: Designs over minority 
parties
a. Executive presidency’s promotions of floor crossing and judicial 
restraints on expulsions by the party.
A direct reference is made in the Constitution of the SLMC 
under Chapter IV, Article 4.4 (b), on the ‘loss of membership’ 
pertaining to ‘floor crossing’ as a reason for expulsion of a member 
from the party. “Any member of the Party without the prior approval 
of the High Command of the Party and/or against the decision of 
the Party accepts office in the administration formed by any other 
Political Party and/or Political Alliance shall ipso facto deemed to 
have lost his membership in the Party” (SLMC Constitution: 6). 
On the occasions when SLMC expelled MPs who had defected 
to the ruling party, the expelled MPs have been able to win Supreme 
Court rulings to enable them to retain their party membership. 
This means that they have been able to retain their membership 
in parliament and cross over to the ruling party to strengthen the 
government. In the recent past, the number of times MPs crossing 
the floor to the government were just too many with the judicial 
provisions functioning as an enabling factor or an incentive.    
In the opinion of the SLMC’s General Secretary, M.T. Hassan 
Ali (2010): 
The SLMC is a party that was conceptualised, got its 
identity and formation under the PR system. Those 
belonging to Tamil and Muslim communities will always 
have members to represent them under this system. We 
were always able to get a representative from outside the 
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North and the East by forging an alliance with the major 
party, and contest on our own within the region where the 
minorities live in higher concentrations, because of this 
system. The problem lies not with the PR system but with 
a judiciary that is allegedly on the side of the executive 
president.
It is not the problem of the PR that affects the minority 
parties. It is the court rulings on expulsion cases that 
weaken the party position which PR is supposed to 
provide. This will pave the way for the eventual extinction 
of minority parties unless this trend is irretrievably 
reversed. On the occasions when our party joined the 
government, we always did so with an MoU signed with the 
conditions and demands of the community put forward. 
The party had the strength in numbers and was not too 
opposed to the policies of the ruling parties at the times of 
the cross over. Sometimes they lasted, and at times they 
did not. However, this time (in August 2010) the party 
(eight members) had to join the government en masse 
unconditionally, mainly owing to five members who were 
threatening to defy the discipline of the party and join the 
government. The decision we had to face was to reduce 
our party to a miniscule minority of three members of 
parliament or go along with the five threatening to join the 
government, whereby we at least preserve the semblance 
of a political group that will have some bargaining power 
with the government in power (Hassan Ali, 2010).   
The patterns of behavior of the minority parties in the post-
2001 period were seen as efforts to wield too much control over the 
making and breaking of governments. This was a result of the PR 
system, in which parties such as SLMC obtained a number of seats 
that would tilt the balance of power. Hence, there was an alleged 
need on the ruling party’s part to devise plans to curb the SLMC’s 
bargaining power. 
The Supreme Court’s rulings in the expulsion cases are seen 
to affect the minority parties and favour the individual who takes 
arbitrary decisions to cross over, irrespective of either the discipline 
of the party or its political orientation. The recent rulings allow 
a member of a party to retain his/her membership in parliament 
in the case of floor crossing, regardless of what party his/her 
membership is originally. This is in sharp contrast of the same 
principle that is applicable in India where, in a recent example, 
the speaker of the state assembly in Karnataka prevented five 
members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly from voting in the 
assembly on a no-confidence motion purely on the basis of a public 
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declaration by them that they intended to vote against their party. 
The State Supreme Court, while not endorsing the decision of the 
speaker until its final determination on the issue, did in fact rule 
that the members’ suspension be sustained until the determination 
of the court. This is another example of judicial activism in India. In 
other words, in Sri Lanka, he or she who crossed over could not be 
expelled from their party which would otherwise strip them of their 
parliamentary membership and make the floor crossing worthless.
b. Independent floor crossing and the party’s loss of MPs 
Since inception, SLMC has lost as many as 10 of its MPs and 
members to the opposition. Some have defected the party when 
they were MPs (elected or forwarded in the National List) by floor 
crossings and others have defected the party for resisting floor 
crossing to the opposition, and instead decided to walk out from 
the government. 
According to the Article 99 (13)b and 161(d) (ii) of the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka, the Supreme Court reserves the right to 
determine if such an expulsion is valid. A judicial review on ‘validity 
of the expulsion’ is imperative. The contending factors in such cases 
are generally ‘rule of natural justice’ or the need for consideration of 
the ‘conscience’ of the MP, and his/her responsibility towards the 
constituency (Rajakaruna, 2010:73). 
The following are MPs who crossed over to the government 
when SLMC was in opposition. The party could not expel these 
members (see Table 1).
Some of the cases pertaining to the members of the SLMC 
dissidents on their applications as expelled members will now be 
explained. Bhaila filed an application under Article 99 (13)(a) of the 
Constitution in the Supreme Court, challenging his expulsion by 
the UNP2. Bhaila entered parliament through the UNP’s National 
List in April, 2004, when SLMC contested under the UNP symbol. 
“Having entered the parliament under the patronage of UNP, he 
has on 18th of May crossed over from the opposition ranks to the 
government ranks which were dominated by UPFA” (ibid:91).  The 
SLMC expelled him on January, 2004. The court’s ruling was 
that the expulsion was invalid. “The [Supreme] Court allowed 
the application of the petitioner on the ground of violation of the 
rules of natural justice in that the petitioner was not given a fair 
hearing being a basic requirement in the process of making any 
decision”3 (ibid: 91). The petitioner also received a letter from the 
UNP addressed to the secretary general of parliament stating that 
the “petitioner has ceased to be a member of the UNP as from  
March 20th, 2002”. The Supreme Court held that neither the SLMC 
nor the UNP could expel Bhaila. The court held that he was not 
a member of the SLMC when the cross over happened as he had 
resigned from the party in October 2003, and that he was also not 
a member of the UNP as he ceased to be one of its member since 
March, 2002 (ibid:92).
Table 1
Members of parliament Date of floor crossing of MP to 
the ruling coalition UPFA
Hussein Ahmed Bhaila   
National List MP of UNP-SLMC. Accepted 
ministerial post soon after floor crossing. 
President Chandrika Bandaraniake 
Kumaratunge’s (CBK) Government, 2004: 
Minister for Science and Technology and Small 
Industries. 
President Mahinda Rajapakse’s(MR) 
Government, 2005: Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs until 2010 election. 
May 18, 2004
M. N. Abdul Majeed 
Elected SLMC MP, Mutur, Trincomalee District. 
Accepted ministerial post soon after floor 
crossing.
CBK Government, 2004: Minister Rehabiltaion 
and  Trinco District Development.
MR Government, 2005: Minister for Cooperative 
and was also Deputy Minister for Local 
Government and Provincial Council until he lost 
in the 2010 general election. 
October 30, 2004
Ameer Ali 
Elected SLMC MP, 2004, Kathankudy, Batticaloa 
District. Accepted ministerial post soon after floor 
crossing. 
 Became Minister of Rehabilitation and Batticaloa 
District Development until he lost in the general 
election of 2010. 
October 30, 2004
Rishard Badurdeen 
Elected SLMC MP, Vanni District 2001. Accepted 
ministerial post soon after floor crossing.
CBK Government, 2004: Minister Resettlement 
and Vanni District Development.
MR Government, 2005: Minister of Resettlement 
and Disaster Relief Services.
MR Govternment, 2010: Minister of Industries 
and Trade. Got elected in parliamentary elections 
of 2010 in same district under ACMC.1 
October 30, 2004
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Why this judicial ruling should affect a minority party has 
been explained in the following: “This is a good example where the 
mechanism of National List was abused to enter into the parliament 
and to cross the floor of the house without being an elected member 
of any of those political parties”. That the MP changed his party 
allegiance, by first resigning from SLMC, was neither in the public’s 
nor a constitueny’s interest (ibid).
In the case of other SLMC MPs, three petitioners from the 
Eastern Province – Ameer Ali (Batticaloa District), M. N. Abdul Majeed 
(Trinco District), and Rishard Badurdeen (Vanni District) – were 
immediately expelled by the high command of the SLMC for what 
it saw as unacceptable cross over for alleged perks and privileges 
when they supported President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s National 
Advisory Council for Peace and Reconciliation. These three had, 
against the party’s will, also accepted project ministerial portfolios 
from the president. These cases, known as Ameer Ali and others 
vs Sri Lanka Muslim Congress4, were taken up together. “The first 
two petitioners were elected SLMP MPs nominated by SLMC at the 
general election held in April 2004 for Batticaloa and Trincomalee 
districts respectively. The third petitioner was a member of the 
Vanni District (from the Northern Province) and was elected as a 
nominee of the UNP” (ibid: 93).
In these cases, the Supreme Court invalidated all three 
expulsions and determined that “those expulsions were contrary 
to natural justice, malafide and ultra vires, the SLMC Constitution. 
The [Supreme] Court5 held that an MP could not be expelled from 
his party save on cogent grounds which are, beyond doubt, in the 
public interest” (ibid). This was also based on the grounds that these 
members of parliament had the right to be led by their ‘conscience’ 
in acting above mere party allegiance.
What ‘cogent’ grounds are is basically in the realm of 
speculation and ultimately subject to the litmus test of political 
persuasion. Interpretation of what ‘natural justice’ is falls within 
the ambit of judicial review. What the dictates of one’s ‘conscience’ 
is a moral issue. The debate of morality versus politics dates 
back to Athenean democracy – hence, Plato’s observation that 
“Philosophers do not make good kings”. Coming to our part of the 
world, Kautilya, the adviser to the Mauriyan King Chandragupta, 
was explicit on the subject: “Morality is not the business of the 
King”. However, in modern-day democracy ‘morality’ and ‘good 
governance’ are integral to the practice of democracy. That should 
put to rest the detractors who quote cultural relativism to justify 
the erosion of democratic norms. 
In the cases above, the Supreme Court had noted that the 
“reasons for expulsion have to transcend personal and parochial 
considerations and should rest on a broader foundation of public 
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good” (ibid: 99). An MP changing party allegiance and accepting 
portfolios should also rest on a “broader foundation of the public 
good because it goes beyond personal and narrow considerations. 
If the Supreme Court has been amenable to adopt this theory in 
recent ‘expulsion cases’ in which the respective petitioners crossed 
over to accept ministerial portfolio, then the decision of those cases 
would have been much more different from the present position. It 
is noted that all recent expulsions were invalidated by court” (ibid). 
There ought to be a “compromise that seeks to protect the 
freedom of conscience of members of parliament, the significance 
and importance of which has not been adequately recognised by the 
Sri Lankan legal community, while also discouraging floor crossing 
for less altruistic and legitimate reasons” (Edrisinha and Welikala, 
2008:16). This is a controversial issue which is criticised by many 
constitutional experts. This is because these rulings affect not only 
the main parties but also severely affect minority parties to the 
extent where their political relevance ceases to exist. This problem 
has to also be considered in the context of the social implications 
of electoral politics in a country like Sri Lanka. The popularity of 
political leaders does not necessarily rest on their political acumen 
alone. In closely-knit communities such as the Muslim community 
in the Eastern Province, leaders are respected and supported due 
to other attributes such as their wealth, social standing, and family 
background. In these circumstances, the constituency supports 
the cross over of the MP not necessarily because of his/her political 
decision, but on the basis of his/her personal attributes. The party, 
under these circumstances, experiences difficulty in being able to 
find a substitute candidate as a replacement – the price of vestigial 
feudalism in modern day democracy. 
Floor crossing of party and loss of MPs to the government
On two occasions of floor crossing, the members crossing 
over had belonged to the SLMC – a constituent party of the ruling 
coalition. 
In November 2007, SLMC MPs resisted the party’s floor 
crossing to the opposition benches and remained with the 
ruling coalition, while retaining their membership in SLMC and 
ministerial portfolios in the government. They did so as members 
representing an ‘SLMC faction’, the National Unity Alliance (NUA), 
or members of a newly formed political party (All Ceylon Muslim 
Congress, National Congress, etc) up to the elections of April 2010, 
in which they contested and lost. The party was weary of expelling 
members and losing expulsion cases in court by this time. Hence, 
they took no action. What this demonstrated was that electors did 
not necessarily endorse the cross over of their representatives. At 
best, they were reconciled to accept a fait accompli.
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Occasion one. In June 2001, the government was in turmoil 
when SLMC, one of its constituent party, quit and left the PA as 
a minority in parliament with only 109 out of 225 seats. SLMC 
had 11 MPs in parliament in 2001, including NUA, which was a 
constituent part of SLMC. Of the 11 MPs from SLMC, four remained 
in government in support of President Chandrika Kumaranatunga, 
opting not to abide with the party’s decision to severe the alliance 
with the government over policy issues.These MPs resisted floor 
crossing when the party did so from the ruling coalition to the 
opposition over the Mawanella riots against Muslims in April 2001.
Occasion two. In January 2007, SLMC, which was hitherto 
in the opposition after contesting in coalition with the UNP at the 
parliamentary election of 2004, carried out a floor crossing and 
joined the ruling UPFA coalition under the executive president 
Mahinda Rajapakse. All six members of the party crossed over to 
the government and accepted government portfolios that year in a 
relationship that lasted for a mere 11 months. 
Occasion three. In November 2007 once again, a floor 
crossing of the party took place to the opposition benches because 
of a land dispute in Pottuvil. SLMC argued that the Muslims’ 
interests in the East had gone unheard. Two out of the six who 
crossed to the opposition benches remained with the government 
and later changed parties.
This trend indicates that each time a minority party leaves 
the government’s ranks and joins the opposition’s benches it loses 
a substantial number of its members who opt to remain with the 
government. “All splinter groups claimed to serve the community, 
but as demonstrated subsequently, they served themselves and left 
the community high and dry. What was common to all these groups 
was that they all made use of the SLMC to come to power, accepted 
positions, and enjoyed perks” (Farook, 2009: 97).
In January 2007, “on the eve of joining the government, heated 
discussions were held at a politburo meeting on whether to join 
the government. Hakeem was reluctant to join the government, but 
many others threatened to join whether Hakeem joined or not. As 
a result, Hakeem was left with little choice – either to go with them 
or remain in an isolated party which was virtually crippled. Some 
said Hakeem joined the government  under pressure from different 
sources to avoid a fifth split which perhaps would have ended up 
as the last nail in the SLMC’s coffin” (Farook, 2009: 98). “These 
Muslim parliamentarians joined the government as individuals and 
small groups. Thus, they negotiated before joining the government, 
not as a bloc but as individuals and groups, and got what they 
wanted – ministerial portfolios and the associated perks” (ibid). 
It has to be noted that such switching of political allegiance 
of individual MPs of the SLMC had never occurred from the ruling 
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party to the opposition except enmasse as a party. But such 
occasions have not had an impact on the government because 
there have been other minority parties to immediately step in to fill 
the breach from the opposition benches – often out of ‘opposition 
weariness’. Joining the government has mainly meant obtaining 
ministerial office. One of the principle weaknesses of the PR system 
in emerging democracies such as Sri Lanka, where institutions and 
traditions are not deeply rooted in political terms, is government 
patronage is an essential ingredient for long-term political survival. 
In some cases, the defection of MPs also happens under 
duress and blackmail when they have alleged ‘skeletons’ in 
their cupboards such as pending trials on charges ranging from 
misdemeanors to murders. Some are, therefore, willing hostages to 
their own fortunes. They are compelled to support the ruling party 
for patronage purposes of different kinds. 
Occasion four. A similar occurrence happened again when 
the SLMC, which was in the opposition from November 2007 until 
August 19, 2010, decided suddenly to vote in favour of the 18th 
Amendment to the Constitution. This was when five of its eight 
members showed interest in joining the government. “For Hakeem, 
there is a big dilemma. At least three of his parliamentarians want 
to support the constitutional changes and are in favour of joining 
the government. Does he let them go or does he decide together with 
them and support the government on the constitutional changes?” 
(Sunday Times, 2010). While three party members remained 
opposed to the provision of the Constitution, they, too, had to follow 
suit to favour the government in order not to further split the party.
There are many ongoing debates as to whether it is reasonable 
to terminate the mandate of an MP when he/she has crossed 
over? It is also questionable as to whether it is justifiable for an 
MP to change allegiance, especially to the ruling party, before his/
her term ends without a fresh mandate from the people. Such a 
mandate may be obtained in a bi-election that allows a member to 
seek endorsement for altered principles or the discovery of a new 
conscience – the existence of which he/she was not aware of until 
the offer of political privileges. 
SLMC deputy secretary general and lawyer, Nizam Kariyappar 
noted (Kariyappar, 2010) that those who crossed over had all the 
right to leave the party on policy matters, but ought to be barred 
from crossing over only for perks and privileges and ministerial 
portfolios. Should they defer from party policies, they could sit in a 
section of parliament for those who were neither in the government 
nor in the opposition (ibid).
We need an effective judicial mechanism. What is problematic 
for the minority political parties is the constitutional provision 
which has given the jurisdiction on floor crossing directly to the 
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Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court is the highest court 
of law, there is no room for further appeals on its judgments. 
We have discussed with the party leader and also proposed that 
the constitution should be amended to give the jurisdiction over 
expulsion cases to both the Supreme Court and a special bench of 
the Court of Appeal. Then, there is provision to appeal against the 
judgment in the Supreme Court against unjustifiable cross overs 
that often happen over perks and privileges. This allows two courts 
to review such cases, allowing more checks and balances of the 
judiciary (ibid).
The above cases would be prime examples of where the most 
powerful hand of the executive presidency and the executive-
friendly judiciary were seen to collaborate as an incentive for MPs’ 
independence and unbinding actions towards the regulations and 
principles of a party structure that they belonged to. Most often, the 
tendency to stay with the earlier rewards and the additional rewards 
for entirely personal gains made MPs look beyond party interests 
and rendered them unanswerable to the party or its constituency 
under the protective wings of the executive presidency – all of which 
has weakened the party.
Minority parties in an executive presidential system
Why the presidential system proves to be a challenge to the 
efficacy and the true democratic functions of a parliament based 
on the principles of PR, is owing to powers vested in the executive 
president. Some of the following features are broadly contentious 
as they could allegedly allow for manipulation: As the head of 
the executive, the president wields significant powers – “powers 
which make it absolutely clear that he/she is in effect far more 
powerful than a prime minister could have been under the former 
system. Firstly, he is no longer answerable to the legislature; the 
Constitution only makes him responsible to parliament… For Article 
42(2) recognises the president as head of the cabinet. It is he who 
appoints the prime minister, determines the number of ministers 
that should be in the cabinet and assigns subjects and functions 
to such ministers. In all this he may or may not consult the prime 
minister; and he could at any time, on his own responsibility even 
without consulting his prime minister, change the assignment 
of subjects and functions and the composition of the cabinet of 
ministers [Article 44(3)]” (Wilson, 1980: 44). This also serves to 
demonstrate the impotence of the parliament and its workings 
under a president whose executive authority is totally immune 
from judicial review. Under these circumstances, the policy of least 
resistance to executive authority is the most seductive form of 
participation – either good or bad – in governance. “There is always 
the possibility that parliament may have a majority opposed to the 
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president. In such an event, a deadlock can ensue. But the ultimate 
responsibility for maintaining continuity in government lies with 
the president” (ibid).
When a coalition party such as the SLMC has proved to be 
a threat to thinning the numbers in a ruling coalition, the party is 
put to the test. In the process, at least in the case of SLMC, it has 
gone through the mill and it has always emerged totally bruised 
with lasting scars leaving it deformed and increasingly unattractive 
to its mass base. 
PR system running in the spirit of FPP
Another reason for the weakness of the system is that in 
PR, although implemented by statute, the process of nursing the 
electorate is still based on the old constituency-based electoral 
system. Under this, candidates are nominated from the district 
to nurse a particular geographical area within the district. This 
encourages the main political parties to field candidates on the basis 
of the financial resources of the candidates to beat one another 
within their own party list in terms of the preference votes. This 
makes one’s political survival dependent on the ability to sustain 
themselves financially. To that extent, joining the main political 
party or entering a coalition with such a party remains attractive. 
This subjects the PR system to the same deficiencies of the FPP 
system. Under the PR system, the minority parties should thrive 
because they could provide a voice to the voiceless minority. Yet, in 
practice, the ruling party has the means to negate the very purpose 
of the existence of minority parties.  
How communal-based politics overthrows PR
Communal-based politics was evident in the presidential 
elections of 2010 between Mahinda Rajapakse and Sarath Fonseka, 
compared to the 2004 elections between Mahinda Rajapakse and 
Ranil Wickremasinghe. In presidential elections in 2005 there was a 
marginal victory for President Mahinda Rajapakse (50.29 per cent), 
while his opponent Ranil Wickremasinghe recorded 48.43 per cent. 
The latter secured the minority leverage, with the majority of his 
votes coming from the north and the east – the peripheries where 
Tamil and Muslim minorities were concentrated. In the presidential 
elections of 2010, President Rajapakse won a comfortable majority 
of 58 per cent and his opponent General Sarath Fonseka 40.15 
per cent. Rajapakse won the Sinhala-majority districts in southern 
and western parts of Sri Lanka, whereas Fonseka’s stronghold 
was in the in less populous Tamil and Muslim areas in the north 
and east. The major Tamil party, Tamil National Alliance (TNA), 
and the major Muslim party, the SLMC, campaigned for Fonseka. 
They hoped they could become kingmakers once again, as Fonseka 
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also pledged to vigorously address the minority grievances and 
abolish the executive presidency.President Rajapakse, however, 
won without much support from the minorities except the LTTE’s 
breakaway groups that contested elections . 
According to a leading political scientist, Jayadeva Uyangoda 
(2010): “Three key trends in the outcomes of the election [are] 
prominent. Firstly, the electoral districts with the concentrations 
of ethnic minorities have overwhelmingly voted for the opposition 
candidate. Secondly, President Rajapakse has obtained little 
support in the urban electorates, where ethnic minorities as well 
as the social elites, represent a sizeable share of voters. Thirdly, 
and emanating from the first and second, is the fact that President 
Rajapakse’s main and strongest base is in the rural districts and 
among the voters of the majority Sinhalese community… One way 
to interpret these trends is to say that the minorities are clearly 
estranged from the Rajapakse regime (ibid: 5).”
The UPFA won a total of 144 seats out of the 225-member 
parliament – only six seats short of two-thirds majority – in the 
parliamentary elections of April 2010 (following on the heals of the 
January 2010 presidential elections). “Under normal circumstances 
of the scheme of proportional representation operating in Sri Lanka, 
no party or coalition could get more than just a simple majority 
of seats… The gap between the votes received by the UPFA and 
the UNP in almost every district outside the north and east was 
unprecedently wide, in many instances the UPFA obtaining about 
65 per cent and the UNF about 30 per cent” (ibid). One wonders 
how this was possible.
Uyangoda gave a combination of reasons for this overwhelming 
victory: one-third of the UNP voters had not voted at all; the 
lackluster election campaign of  UNP; the crisis in the party over the 
leadership. These, among others, “seem to have caused a great deal 
of apathy and despair among key sectors of the UNP’s vote base. 
That eventually paved the way for the UPFA to obtain 144 seats 
– normally a near impossible achievement under the PR system” 
(ibid: 8).   
However, this paper points out that the main reason for a 
near-impossible victory, apart from the reasons given above, is 
indisputably the nature of Sri Lankan politics which has become 
communal based. The presidential elections of 2005, the war 
victories, the presidential elections of 2010, and the parliamentary 
elections that followed, gave a tremendous boost to the party in 
power, mainly owing to the communal politics at play. 
As mentioned elsewhere in the paper, in the 1960s-1970s the 
FPP system did not necessarily reflect the political divisions of the 
electorate in terms of the numerical representation in the legislature. 
The introduction of the PR system was intended to avoid such an 
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eventuality of any party obtaining a two-thirds majority to amend 
the Constitution. This was demonstrated in the elections of the 
1980s-1990s. However, as  Uyangoda pointed out, the polarisation 
of the communities and the triumphalism of Sinhala majoritarian 
dominance resuted in the ruling party coming very close to a two-
thirds majority in the legislature de facto. Subsequent defections 
made it de jure two-thirds majority.
The results of the parliamentary elections of April 2010 that 
gave the SLFP-led UPFA coalition a near two-thirds majority showed 
how this trend was accelerated, leading the country to a virtual 
single-party state. This situation questioned all the assumptions 
that had justified the introduction of PR.
Retrospective analysis is illuminating. In a country where 
there is a wide disparity in ethnic proportions (75 per cent Sinhalese, 
12 per cent Tamil, and eight per cent Muslim), communal-based 
politics ensures majoritarian dominance while PR principles – 
intended to support minority/smaller communities and groups – 
become obsolete.
As far as political theories go, it is only natural that parties 
prefer to stay in the ruling coalition government. Coalition theorist 
Kaare Strom (1990) pointed out that under special conditions parties 
could prefer not to join governing coalitions. In his opinion, there 
were times when a party preferred to stay in the opposition. This 
would be mainly if it believed that this would enhance its electoral 
fortunes and enhance its ability to enter future cabinet coalitions 
with a stronger bargain/position. Hence, in exceptional cases like 
in the case of SLMC, we have found that there were times when 
the party was also satisfied with a formal opposition role because it 
felt that it would have an influential legislative role by being in the 
opposition if not a part of the government.
Lijphart (1999) opposed Horowitz’s idea that such parties have 
no incentive to compromise and be in ruling coalitions. Lijphart 
argued that such parties were the exceptions. “The more usual 
inclination of parties is to want to be included in cabinets. Because 
the only way for ethnic or any other parties not just to enter but also 
to stay in the cabinet is to reach compromises with their coalition 
partners, they have a very strong incentive to compromise-political 
power – instead of no such incentive as Horowitz mistakenly argues 
(ibid).
These arguments remain cogent as far as the theoretical and 
conceptual level of discussion of a higher order between Horowitz 
and Lijphart. In reality, the case in point here is the fact that we are 
attempting to reconcile the best features of PR with an executive 
presidential system in which the executive is elected, with the entire 
country considered as a single constituency, and in which voters 
gravitate towards ethnic identity in such a way not peculiar to Sri 
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Lanka. For instance, President Obama had a captive constituency 
of African Americans and Latinos. This will always be the case in a 
country which votes as a single constituency made up of different 
ethnic groupings. However, in Sri Lanka the majority Sinhala 
community forms three-quarters of the population. In effect, this 
makes it a monolithic state at the expense of the minorities. 
The smaller parties in such a system, let alone enjoying 
the choice of forging a ‘coalition of commitment’, can hardly stay 
in a ‘coalition of convenience’ to begin with.  That, too, like in 
France in the 1962-74 and 1981-86 periods, is considered ‘hyper-
presidential’, where one usually exercises predominant power as 
opposed to semi-presidentialism (Keeler and Schain 1997: 95-97). 
The features of a ‘hyper-presidential’ system were what Sri Lanka 
emulated in 1978 in introducing those features to the executive 
presidential system that have prevailed to date in the country. 
Hence, the credibility of the parliament is bound to be subservient 
to the executive presidential system and be at its whims and fancies. 
Hence, the cases presented in the paper point out the fact that the 
scheme of events, as referred to by Horowitz and Lijphart above, 
cannot apply to a complex context such as the prevailing political 
conditions in Sri Lanka. At the end of the three-decade war, what 
we have got is a Gaullist system or an emerging Bonapartism which 
takes us back two centuries. 
Conclusion 
The PR system provided the very process that created the 
SLMC – the largest political movement of the Muslim community 
in the country with a singularly Muslim identity. The system has, 
therefore, helped ambitious Muslim politicians to achieve power. 
It provided little or no leverage to the minority Muslim community 
itself. The fragmentation of the SLMC into about three different 
political groupings occurred as a result of incentives in the forms 
of political office and other benefits offered by the major political 
parties and executive presidency. The current situation is a clear 
demonstration of a very attractive phrase that has gained wide 
currency in post-presidential election of 2010: “Power is delightful; 
absolute power is absolutely delightful”. Hence, it could be observed 
through the unfolding events that the PR system worked at its best 
in the context of a strong parliament with the power of oversight 
over the executive presidency. Floor crossing, which is one of the 
concerns of this paper, is of course subject to judicial review. 
That judicial review has to be within defined guidelines that are 
transparent. The issue that needs to be adjudicated is whether the 
member crossing over is in violation of the collective will of the party 
in terms of party discipline. Here is a parliament that is powerless 
vis-a-vis the presidential system. The inner workings show how 
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members desert parties frequently, especially when preferring to 
be part of the ruling parties. Therefore, the PR system is not very 
successful in the Sri Lankan context.
Ensuring minority rights while appeasing the aspirations of 
the majority is possible in an electoral system that combines both 
PR and FPP systems. It is a process of constitutional engineering 
that needs to be addressed in a discussion that does not fall within 
the ambit of this paper. Communal-based politics that has come 
into play in contemporary Sri Lanka renders the features of PR 
irrelevant, given the disparities in ethnic proportions that will 
always override minority interests. In post-war Sri Lanka, the 
majority triumphalism is a phenomenon that can change only with 
equitable distribution of resources and with both political and fiscal 
devolution. Economic prosperity will transcend racial barriers and 
communal faultlines. 
Endnotes 
1 All Ceylon Muslim Congress, formed in 2001, is a breakaway fraction of the SLMC.
2 Hussein Ahmed Bhaila v Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, United National Party and 
Others, S.C. spl (expulsion) no; 01/2005, decided on 8/6/2005.
3 The bench comprised Shirani Banadaranayake J., Nihal Jayasinghe J., and Nimal 
Ratnayake J.
4 Ameer Ali and others v Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and others, [2006] 1 Sri LR 189. 
The three applications were: No 2/2005,3/2005 and 4/2005 filed under Article 99 
(13)(a) of the Constitution, and taken up together in the Supreme Court (Rajakaruna 
2010:93).
5 The bench comprised Sarath N. Silva C.J., Nihal Jayasinghe J., N. K. Udalagama 
J., Ninal Dissanayake J., and Raja Fernando J. (ibid).
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